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Abstract 
The market structure can be described by concentration ratios based on the 
oligopoly theory or the structure – conduct – performance paradigm. Measures of 
concentration and also competition are essential for banks conduction in the 
banking industry. Several researchers have proved concentration level to be major
determinants of banking system efficiency. Theoretical characteristics of market 
concentration measures are illustrated with empirical evidence. The market 
structure of the Albanian Banking Sector has changed dramatically in recent years. 
On 1990s, our country has experienced deregulation, foreign bank penetration, and 
an accelerated process of consolidation and competition in the banking sector. 
Particularly, the working paper examines the nature and the extent of changes in 
market concentration of Albanian banking sector. It focused primarily on a 
descriptive and dynamic analysis of change in the concentration indices in banking 
sector from year to year. Also it examines how the inherited structure of the 
banking system affects the way of the distribution of market shares amongst the 
different banks that comprise on the banking sector. 
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 ARJAN TUSHAJ  
Market concentration in the banking sector: 
Evidence from Albania 
 
1 Introduction  
The changes in the market structure of firms could be examined through various 
measures. In order to analyze the market structure on banking industry, sometimes 
we focused on banking concentration. Market concentration is one of the most im-
portant determinants of competitiveness (Nathan and Neavel, 1989). There are nu-
merous ways of measuring banking concentration. While Rose (1999: 687) states: 
“the degree of concentration in a market is measured by the proportion of assets or 
deposits controlled by the largest banks serving that market”, Demirgüç -Kunt and 
Levine (2000) measure banking system concentration via the fraction of bank loans 
controlled by the three largest banks in a banking system. According to Bonin 
(2004), former centrally planned economies used to be characterized by a notice-
able structural segmentation (i.e. large specialty banks monopolizing specific mar-
ket segment), state ownership of a significant proportion of banking assets and high 
concentration ratios. 
First of all, we have to present the development of banking sector in Albania. Bank-
ing sector in Albania has undergone a deep transformation since 1992 and wit-
nessed an impressive growth over recent years. The banking industry remains the 
largest and the most development segment of the Albanian financial market. The 
banking sector plays an important role in economy but it cannot be considered iso-
lates from historical political and economic environment. 
The banking sector before the ’90 was a mono bank. Bank deposits were the only 
officially available savings / investment instruments for individuals in socialist Al-
banian economy. The exclusive source of external financing for the enterprise sec-
tor was credit provided on the basis of investment and production decisions by cen-
tral planning bodies. State Bank of Albania the only bank that functioned did not 
take credit allocation decisions and did not need to evaluate credit risk. State Bank 
of Albania performed both central bank and the commercial bank functions. As a 
central bank, it was responsible for issuance of currency, supervision of monetary 
policy and it assisted the needs of state enterprises for credit and money depositing 
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by keeping their accounts. Another bank that operated in agricultural sector was the 
Agrarian Bank like depositing and lending institution.  
The first important step in the reformation of the Albanian banking system was the 
creation of a two-tier banking system. This transformation was only made possible 
in Albania through the law of the Bank of Albania passed by the parliament in 
April 1992. The law of 1992, installed from the independent point of view, a broad 
autonomy for the Bank of Albania. This bank retained all traditional functions of 
the Central Bank (direction of the monetary policy, credits, interest rates, exchange 
rates and emission), while the new commercial banks recently born, were in charge 
of all transactions of credit allocation and acceptance of deposits from businesses 
and individuals. 
So the approval of new legal framework of banking system on 1992 marked the 
establishment a new banking system. It acclaimed Bank of Albania as a central 
bank as the existence of three state- owned banks;  Saving Bank (SB), National 
Commercial Bank (NCB) and Agriculture Commercial Bank (ACB). The second 
level banks inherited the activity of formers bank (two banks and one saving –
insurance institute). 
After two decades of transition process, Albanian financial sector belongs to the 
type of model that is “The financial sector dominated by the bank sector”.  
The paper is organized as follows. The following section provides a review of the 
relevant literature. Section 3 gives an overview of dynamic changes on Albanian 
banking sector. Section 4 presents the relevant literature on the measures of con-
centration in banking industry. Also it presents and discusses the empirical results 
of market concentration in Albanian banking sector. And finally Section 5 con-
cludes the working paper. 
2 Literature review  
2.1 Controversial results: Pro and cons banking concentration 
The degree of banking market structure matters for competition and performance 
has been a “hotly debated topic”. The outcomes of numerous researches have re-
sulted in the existence of numerous bank concentration theories in the literature. 
These theories could be classified into pro-concentration and cons concentration 
theories. Concentration refers to the degree of control of economic activity by large 
firms (Sathye, 2002: 10). The increase in concentration levels could be due to con-
siderable size enlargement of the dominant firm(s) and/or considerable size reduc-
tion of the non-dominant firm(s). Conversely, reduction in concentration levels 
 Market concentration in banking sector: Evidence from Albania 5 
could be due to considerable size reduction of the dominant firm(s) and/or consid-
erable size enlargement of the non-dominant firm(s) (Athanasoglou et al., 2005: 
25). 
Proponents of banking sector concentration argue that economies of scale drive 
bank mergers and acquisitions (increasing concentration), so that increased concen-
tration goes hand-in-hand with efficiency improvements (Demirgüç -Kunt and Le-
vine, 2000: 1). Some theoretical arguments and country comparisons suggest that a 
less concentrated banking sector with many small banks is more prone to financial 
crises than a concentrated banking sector with a few large banks. This is partly be-
cause reduced concentration in a banking market results in increased competition 
among banks and vice-versa. Proponents of this ‘‘concentration-stability’’ view 
argue that larger banks can diversify better so that banking systems characterized 
by a few large banks will be tend to be less fragile than banking systems with many 
small banks (Allen and Gale, 2003). Concentrated banking systems may also en-
hance profits and therefore lower bank fragility. High profits provide a buffer 
against adverse shocks and increase the franchise value of the bank, reducing in-
centives for bankers to take excessive risk. Furthermore, a few large banks are eas-
ier to monitor than many small banks, so that corporate control of banks will be 
more effective and the risks of contagion less pronounced in a concentrated bank-
ing system (Beck, Demirgüç -Kunt and Levine, 2003: 1).  
Cons concentration, there is evidence linking increase in banking concentration to 
reductions in credit supply. In the United States, Berger et al (1995) find evidence 
that the increase in the proportion of banking industry assets controlled by the larg-
est banking organizations in the 1990s, due to the liberalization of geographic re-
strictions on banking in the United States, may have been responsible for part of the 
credit crunch observed in 1989-92. It has also been argued that the higher the con-
centration in the local bank market; the higher prices are for financial services, and 
consequently the higher the banks’ profits. This is because banks in less competi-
tive environments charge higher interest rates to firms. If concentration is positively 
associated with banks having market power, then concentration will increase both 
the expected rate of return on bank assets and the standard deviation of those re-
turns (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2004: 2). The policy implication is that 
higher market concentration is associated with lower socio-economic welfare and, 
therefore, higher concentration is undesirable. Another cons concentration position 
is that a more concentrated banking structure enhances bank fragility. Advocates of 
this “concentration-fragility” view note that larger banks frequently receive subsi-
dies through implicit ‘‘too big to fail’’ policies that small banks do not enjoy (Boyd 
and Runkle, 1993). Proponents of the concentration-fragility view disagree with the 
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proposition that a few large banks are easier to monitor than many small banks. If 
size is positively correlated with complexity, then large banks may be more opaque 
than small banks, and therefore more difficult to monitor. This would tend to pro-
duce a positive relationship between concentration and fragility.  
Theoretical results demonstrate that monopolistic market power of banks raises the 
opportunity costs of capital and thus, tends to make financing more expensive 
(Smith, 1998). Lack of adequate competition in banking could thus, adversely af-
fect economic development. 
2.2 Relationship between market concentration and banking 
competition  
The literature on the measurement of competition may be divided into two main-
streams, called the structural and the non-structural approach. The structural ap-
proach to model competition includes the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) 
paradigm and the efficiency hypothesis, as well as a number of formal approaches 
with roots in Industrial Organization theory. The SCP paradigm investigates 
whether a highly concentrated market causes collusive behavior among larger 
banks resulting in superior market performance; whereas the efficiency hypothesis 
tests whether it is the efficiency of larger banks that makes for enhanced perform-
ance. In reaction to the theoretical and empirical deficiencies of the structural mod-
els, non-structural models of competitive behavior have been developed:  the Iwata 
model, the Bresnahan model, and the Panzar and Rosse model. These New Empiri-
cal Industrial Organization approaches measure competition and emphasize the 
analysis of banks’ competitive conduct without using explicit information about 
market structure. 
If we accept the theoretical proposition according to which a more concentrated 
market implies a lower degree of competition due to undesirable exercise of market 
power by banks. Other theories (e.g. contestability theory) maintain that, under par-
ticular conditions, competition and concentration can coexist. 
To analyze competitiveness in any sector, an in-depth analysis of the structure of 
the market is essential. While highly concentrated markets do not necessarily imply 
lack of competitive behavior, it is generally agreed that market concentration is one 
of the most important determinants of competitiveness (Nathan and Neavel, 1989). 
For banking sector, the relationship between market concentration and competi-
tiveness has been examined in detail for many countries and the results indicated 
that a high concentration tends to reduce competitiveness in this sector (Gilbert, 
1984). 
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Given the current wave of mergers in the EU banking market and the expectation of 
continued or even accelerating consolidation, concerns have been voiced as to 
competitive conditions in the EU banking markets, especially in some market seg-
ments, such as local and retail markets. More precisely, the question emerges 
whether market concentration might affect the conduct of banks or the degree of 
competition. Theoretically, the existence of a relationship between market structure 
and banks’ behavior is indicated by, among others, the Panzar-Rosse model. 
Where, in the literature, the impact of the banking market structure on bank per-
formance has been examined exhaustively - employing the Structure-Conduct-
Performance (SCP) paradigm - the relevance of market structure for conduct or 
competitive conditions has been almost entirely ignored1. This section aims at pre-
senting this disregarded relationship and seeks to assess a possible impact of the 
number of banks and the banking market concentration on competition. However, 
as a description of the market structure, the number of banks is a rather limited 
concept. Empirical studies concerning the impact of market structure on banks’ 
conduct are rare. In order to investigate this relationship, the estimated H-values2 
indicating competition are used as proxies of conduct and are related both to the 
concentration indices considered and to the absolute number of banks operating in 
these markets, acting together as a proxy of the market structure. The impact of 
both market structure measures on competition appears to be significant, most 
markedly so when the k-bank concentration indices are used. The latter confirms 
the observation that a few large (cartel) banks can restrict competition and that a 
multitude of fringe competitors is unable to engender competition. Casu and Girar-
done (2006) examine banking markets for 15 European Union countries over the 
period 1997-2003 and find no evidence that their calculated H-statistics are related 
to concentration measures. Similar results are found by Claessens and Laeven 
(2004) in a study of 50 countries over the period 1994-2001.16 Yildirim and 
Philippatos (2007) find no significant link between concentration and competition 
(using the H-statistic) for eleven Latin American countries for the period 1993-
2000, but do find evidence that openness to foreign entry increases competition.  
                                                     
1 See Calem and Carlino (1991) for an example of the empirical approximation of conduct. 
2 See Bikker and Haaf, 2001b. 
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3 Structural changes in Albanian banking sector  
3.1 The first phase 1992-1997:  Banks under "State Monopoly"  
In this phase, banking sector was associated with several shortcomings and positive 
developments but however fragile. The most important evolution was the creation 
of a two-tier banking system. This transformation was only made possible in Alba-
nia through the law of the Bank of Albania passed by the parliament in April 1992. 
The law of 1992, installed from the independent point of view, a broad autonomy 
for the Bank of Albania.  The new legal framework acclaimed Bank of Albania as a 
central bank as the existence of three state- owned banks; Saving Bank (SB), Na-
tional Commercial Bank (NCB) and Agriculture Commercial Bank (ACB). The 
second level banks inherited the activity of former bank (two banks and one saving 
–insurance institute). But the level of financial intermediation was limited. State 
banks that dominate about 90% in the deposit market, carry out limited functions of 
financial intermediaries, while new private banks were limited in number (only 4) 
and uninterested to attract deposits in leks. The lowest level of crediting to the 
economy (only for state enterprises) was a expression of low-level mediation in 
addition to the low level of payments’ system. For example, at the end of 1996, the 
implementation of payments for transactions through accounts in different branches 
of the same bank required on the average of 5-6 days, while transactions between 
different banks required over 15 days. Because of it, the levels of money outside 
banks were extremely high. The numbers of banks were growing up 3 to 6 respec-
tively till 1992 to 1996.  
3.2 Second phase 1997–2002:  Banks under Privatization 
Privatisation of the banking system means, weakening the role of the state in exis-
tent banks, creating new private banks, and also increasing competition. Privatiza-
tion of the state-owned banks can contribute to this restructuring. In 2002 after 10 
years of privatisation the Albanian Banking sector was still dominated by the last 
state-owned bank, Saving Bank. Saving Bank was dominant in the overall perform-
ance of the Albanian banking system, network extension, deposit market and T- 
bills market. Some of the main indicators of the SB in that period were (Bank of 
Albania, 2003): 
• Territorial expansion with over 200 branches and agencies  
• About 60% of total deposit of banking system 
• About 75% of T-bills market 
• Over 70 % of the retiree payments 
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• Over 90 % of the payments volume for state budget accounts 
• The total of assets was 170 billion leks. (1 euro = 143 leks)  
The financial crisis of 1997 caused of pyramid schemes lie ahead to be solve the 
dilemma: Liquidation – Reconstruction – or Privatization for the state owned capi-
tal banks. Agricultural Commercial Bank went into liquidation and part of its assets 
was distributed to other state –owned banks while bad loans, were transferred to the 
Agency of Credit Restructuring. After a long discussion to be liquidated or to be 
privatized, lastly was decided that the other state-owned banks National Commer-
cial Bank to privatized too. The inefficiency of these banks showed that the first 
steps of restructuring the system were inadequate. So Saving Bank before privatiza-
tion underwent a structuring process. Reforms on financial sector had recorded sig-
nificant progress related to the privatization of state banks, thus reducing their 
dominance in the market. In 1997-2002, the composition of banking sector was 
formatted according to ownership and presents as following: 
• state - owned bank, Albanian Savings Bank (G1) 
• joint -venture banks (G2) 
• private banks (G3) 
Banking activity expanded to the expansion of banks in the market, through in-
creasing assets, financial intermediation and quality of banking services. A positive 
trend was improving credits’ market as a steady increase of lending to the private 
sector. It was associated with the reduction of “bad” credits to total credits which it 
was 6.4 % in the September 2002 compared with 32.7 % in 19993. This phase re-
lated to the entry of various private banks, particularly foreign banks. The number 
of second tier banks went to 14 or two more times compare to the end of 1996.  
3.3 Third phase 2003 - 2007:  Privatization of the whole banking 
system  
After the privatization of the second bank of G1, National Commercial Bank 
(NCB) in 1999, Saving Bank (SB) was the last representative of state–owned 
banks. SB (actually Raiffeisen Bank) continued to keep its domination on deposit 
market, was competing with private banks which were raising significantly their 
market share, by involving more risk and profitable assets. So versus the biggest 
bank in the system were the private banks that had bolstered competition in the 
                                                     
3 Source: Bank of Albania, 2003. 
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market and contributed to an increase in the range and quality of financial services 
in the country.  
In 2003-2007, the composition of banking sector was formatted according to asset 
share owned by banks in percentage. Thus, we distinguish three main peer groups: 
• Banks that have less than 2 % of assets volume (G1); 
• Banks that have less more than 2 % of assets volume   but less than 7% (G2); 
• Banks that have more than 7 % of assets volume (G3); 
During this period happened privatization of the state's largest bank, the Savings 
Bank which it purchased by a large international bank as Raiffeisen International. 
This transaction turned entirely banking sector into private ownership. It would 
have the direct effects on banking competition. However the moment of privatiza-
tion of the Savings Bank coincided with the entry into force of Law no. 9121 "On 
protection of competition", which does not prevent possession of a dominant posi-
tion, but only abuse this dominant position. Meanwhile, three new private banks: 
Credins, People's Bank and Union Bank with Albanian ownership entered into 
banking system. Thus they reduced the foreign shareholders into banking system 
which it was dominated by them until now. From an oligopolistic market structure 
in the last decade, it went towards market of monopolistic competition. Banking 
sector is associated with several mergers of foreign banks during 2007. These de-
velopments have had a major impact on market concentration and threaten domes-
tic capital ownership. In recent years, the Albanian banking system is characterized 
by a continued increased trend, both in terms of number of banks and in the expan-
sion of banking activity. These trends are accompanied by an increase of lending 
activity and expansion of the range of products offered by banks, too. At the end of 
2007, there were 17 second level banks on banking market.  
4 Measures of banking concentration 
4.1 Literature review on measures of concentration in banking 
industry 
The concept of industrial concentration has been comprehensively treated and de-
batable in the economic literature. Structure – Conduct – Performance (SCP) para-
digm can be based on any concentration ratio. Two formal derivations of the com-
petition – concentration relationship based on oligopoly theory each exactly define 
the relevant concentration ratios. The significance of concentration ratios comes 
due to their ability to capture structural features of the market. Concentration ratios 
are also able to reflect changes in concentration as a result of the bank’s entry into 
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the market or its exit from it, or caused by a merger. Despite the several various 
approaches related to its measurement, the principal elements of concentration 
measures are number of banks and the distribution of bank size in a given market. 
Like indices of inequality, various concentration indices put different weights over 
different parts of the distribution of market shares across firms and may give am-
biguous results. Let there be n firms in an industry with market shares s1, s2,.. , sn. A 
simple but general linear form of an index of industrial concentration (IC) is: 
 
1
n
i i
i
CI s w
=
=∑  
whereby wi (i=1,2, …, n) are the weights attached to the market share. 
Marfels (1971) and Dickson (1981) discussed the weighting schemes of a number 
of concentration ratios. Following the taxonomy of Marfels (1971), there could be 
four broad classes of weighing schemes: (i) unity to top k firms and zero to the rest, 
(ii) individual ranks of firms, (iii) firms’ own market shares or their power, and (iv) 
the negative of the logarithm of market shares. The weighing scheme reflects dif-
ferent assessment regarding the relative impact of larger and smaller firms. De-
pending upon the weighing scheme, the individual measures may vary, but they 
may lead to similar orderings. 
There are several indicators to concentration ratio of k-banks. Amongst of them 
emphasize4: the concentration ratio (CRk); Herfindahl - Hirschman index (HHI); 
Hall - Tideman index (HTI); Rosenbluth index (RI); Comprehensive Industrial 
Concentration Index (CCI); Hannah and Kay index (HKI); The index (U); mul-
tiplikativ Haus index (Hm); additive index Hausa (ha) and the entropy measure (E).  
The most common measure used in the literature on market concentration has been 
a simple concentration index, aggregating such shares of a few top firms (say, k). 
These measures for banking firms are called k-Bank Concentration Ratios. There is 
no rule for choosing an appropriate value of k. So, the number of firms included in 
the concentration index is an ad hoc and an arbitrary decision. The index ranges 
from zero to unity. The index approaches zero for an infinite number of equally 
sized banks and it equals unity, if the firms included in the calculation of the con-
centration ratio make up the entire industry. It takes the forms:  
 
1
n
k i
i
CR s
=
=∑  
                                                     
4 See Bikker and Haaf, 2001a 
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This indicator ignores many small banks in the market. If the industry consists of 
"k" banks with the same size, 
 
1 1
n n
k i
i i
i k
CR s
n n= =
= = =∑ ∑ ,  
which is an ascending function of the banks’ number in the market, from which 
flows an equivalent number:  ne = k/CRk  (White, 1982). 
Another popularly used measure is the Hirfendahl-Hirschman index (HHI). In the 
United States, HHI plays a significant in the enforcement process of antitrust law in 
banking sector. It often called the full-information index because it captures fea-
tures of the whole distribution of bank sizes. For n firms in an industry with market 
shares si , (i=1,2, ... , n), the HHI is defined as: 
 2
1
n
i
i
HHI s
=
=∑  
By definition (1/n) <HHI <1, where n is the number of banks in banking industry. 
The maximum concentration of unity occurs in the case of monopoly. Minimum of 
concentration (1/n) occurs when each bank has an equal share of 1/n. Despite its 
popularity, HHI suffers from a few limitations. A major limitation is that distribu-
tions of market shares with radically different tail properties may have HHI of simi-
lar magnitude (Rhoades, 1995). Recently, Maasoumi and Slottje (2002) have ar-
gued that common economic phenomena like mergers between a strong and a weak 
bank or entries and exits only change certain parts of the distribution of market 
share – often the tails only. Indices based solely on “dispersion’’ or variance, (e.g., 
HHI, Gini, etc.) may miss such changes. 
Davies (1979) analyzed the sensitivity of HHI into two compound parts: the num-
ber of banks in the market and the inequality in market shares among the different 
banks. He found that the index becomes less sensitive to changes in the number of 
banks, to the larger number of banks in the industry.  
HHI can be written as an increasing function of the population variance of market 
shares. 
Various authors propose connecting the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to distribu-
tional theories by presenting it in terms of the moments of the underlying bank size 
distribution. The first attempt to present the HHI in terms of distribution’s mean 
and variance has been undertaken by Adelman (1969). Kwoka (1985) rewrote the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as: 
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 ( )2
1
n
i
i
HHI s s s
=
= + −∑  
by defining the mean market share as 1s n= .  
Re-arranging yields the HHI as an inverse function of the banks’ number in the in-
dustry and a direct function of the market shares’ variance about the mean: 
 21HHI n
n
σ= +  
This presentation picks up two features of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. First, 
the relation between the number of banks and HHI value is not a simple one. For 
given number of the banks in the market, the HHI increases with the variance, 
which it is itself a function of the number of banks in the market (Adelman, 1969). 
Secondly, it is ambiguous because of a variety of combinations of the number and 
size of banks can produce the same HHI (Kwok, 1985).  
In the context of the hypothetical market analysis, Rhoades (1995) argued that ine-
quality of market shares to banks can change substantially in different markets and 
keeps the same value of HHI. It is possible to compute an equivalent number of 
HHI as:  
 1en HHI
=  per value of HHI 
(since 
2 2
1
1 1n
i
i
HHI n
n n n=
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= = =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∑  proving evidence that at least two different 
bank size distributions can generate the same HHI).  
Hart (1975) took a somewhat different approach to insert the HHI into distribu-
tional theory. He emphasized that there are some cases where the exact number of 
banks in an industry is unknown, but information is available about both the bank-
ing market size and banks’ size classification. He proposed to separate the total dis-
tribution of banks sizes into classes and to calculate the parameters of the original 
distribution from the parameters of the first moment of distribution if the relation-
ship between the distributions is known. He obtained a definition of HHI given by:  
 
2 1
HHI
n
η +=  
where 2η  is the coefficient of variation of the original distribution. As long as the 
coefficient of variation does not change, an increase in n will result in a decrease of 
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HHI. Hart considered the sensitivity to the entrance of the smallest banks in a oli-
gopolistic market as the greatest disadvantage of the index.   
4.2 Measures of market concentration in Albanian banking 
sector 
The dynamic developments in banking sector have had a major impact on market 
concentration. Let’s analyze the empirical results of banking concentration in the 
Albanian banking market, referring to the concentration ratios, CR3 and CR5 and 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index during 2000-2008. Concentration indices are cal-
culating for four components of banking activity: assets, deposits, credits, treasure 
bills. 
4.2.1 Market concentrations on banking assets 
The banking sector in Albania has generally been described by the dominating po-
sition of the large five banks. An important indicator for measuring the concentra-
tion level is the CR5-Concentration ratio-calculating the weight of 5 largest banks in 
the system to total assets of the system. The share of these 5 banks in overall assets 
of banking system was 83 percent by the end of 2004 - a year when SB began to act 
as private bank-to 74 percent in the end of 2007. During the last years, this indica-
tor has shown a continuous falling trend, with a deviation in 2008, due to the 
merger of two banks. The structure of banking sector has evolved substantially. The 
increase in number of banks and expansion of activities has slightly reduced the 
dominance of banking system by G3 banks, although the market share of this group 
continued to be high. In December 20085, the shares of peer bank groups to total 
assets of the system are 3.9 percent, 31.0 percent, 65.1 percent for G1, G2 and G3, 
respectively, versus 3.6 percent, 30.3 percent and 66.1 percent at the end of the 
third quarter of the year; and 3.4 percent, 27.9 percent and 68.7 percent at the end 
of 2007.  
However the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to total assets showed stable levels. In 
recent years, there has been great progress towards optimal concentration level, al-
though still far from it. Despite the incident trend of concentration indicators during 
this period, assets’ market in the Albanian banking sector continues to be highly 
concentrated. Table 1 presents the empirical results for banking assets during 2000-
2008. HHI calculations for all components are based on Kwoka version (1985). See 
subsection 4.1. 
                                                     
5 Bank of Albania, Supervision Annual Report, 2008. 
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Table 1. Concentration ratios (%) and HHI for assets  
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
CR3 80 75 72 70 69 64 62 56 55 
CR5 89 87 86 85 83 78 76 72 74 
HHI 0.44 0.37 0.32 0.30 0.27 0.21 0.18 0.15 0.15 
Source: Bank of Albania, 2000-2008, own calculations 
4.2.2 Market concentrations on banking deposits 
Saving Bank had a dominant position in the deposit market too, holding about 60 % 
of it. There was the largest concentration in the deposits market. It is important to 
mention that private banks were more active in foreign currency deposits market 
and current account deposits, where SB had no dominance. At the same time SB 
had monopole position in leks deposits. It has about 80 % of them. After the priva-
tization of Saving Bank, the dominant position of SB in the deposits market substi-
tuted by the dominating position of the 5 largest banks. During the last years of this 
period, we see that deposits structure, expectations and preferences of clients 
changed as a result of increasing competition among banks of G1 and G2. Analyz-
ing deposit concentration by number of depositors, we note that G1 small-sized 
banks have the highest number of depositors. The Albanian banking system shows 
a high degree of deposit concentration, where the 5 largest banks in the system 
comprised 78 percent of total deposits, at end-December 2008. 
After 2003, according to the HHI for deposits continued to be high that it indicates 
the market is more concentrated on G3, otherwise the trend is decreasing. The main 
reason was the inherited structure of banking sector. Table 2 presents us a view on 
banking deposits concentration in the market. 
Table 2. Concentration ratios (%) and HHI for deposits 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
CR3 84 80 77 75 73 68 65 60 62 
CR5 92 90 88 87 85 81 79 76 78 
HHI 0.50 0.43 0.37 0.35 0.31 0.24 0.20 0.17 0.17 
Source: Bank of Albania, Supervision Annual Report, 2000-2008, own calculations 
Deposit market remains concentrated compared with the assets market. Although 
the level of concentration of deposits among the years has fallen, the figures are 
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greater than optimal value, which shows a high concentration of market deposits in 
the banking sector. This may come as a result of a combination of several factors: 
use of high levels of capital and disengagement of deposits as a source of funds by 
some banks (mostly new banks); preferences of customers; facility in access of cus-
tomers if we take into account the geographical distribution of  bank branches and 
agencies. 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is correlated to the number of banks and mone-
tary aggregate, M2. This relationship relies on an econometric estimation. The 
econometric analysis gives the following linear model: 
dHHI = 4.675 – 0.684 * M2 – 0.036 * nr 
Results are significant (because R2 = 0.97), but the coefficients of variables are sig-
nificant, too (p<0.05). Meanwhile the effect of the number of banks on HHI for de-
posits is consistent to the theory. As we see in the model, the sign of number of 
banks is negative. That means a negative relationship between HHI for deposits and 
the number of banks. If we refer to the effect of monetary aggregate, M2, is also 
negative. That means the increasing of M2 which compounded by several kinds of 
deposits, associated with decreasing of HHI for deposits. Growing up of deposits 
volume linked to the prospect of depositors to put down their deposits in different 
banks.  
4.2.3 Market concentrations on banking credits 
Analysing the concentration ratios for total credits we conclude that SB had a 
dominant position like as on the other activities. At 2001-2002 SB not only had 
dominant position but its percentage of credits represents minimal figures. What’s 
happened?   
During the last decade, lending activity from banking sector depended by political 
and economic factors as well as by other phenomena characteristic for transition 
period in Albania. During 1993-1999 Bank of Albania (Central Bank) applied di-
rect instruments of monetary policy, establishing limitations on lending from bank-
ing system. But this instrument had not prevented the banks from crediting of 
economy. Till end of 1996, credit market was dominated by three state owned 
banks. In views of various factors, these banks did not select efficiently their clients 
and bad loans occupied the credits system. In 1997 it reached to 60%. For this rea-
son Bank of Albania suspending lending activity of banks whose bad loan ratio was 
above 20%. In this period SB was impeded to extend credits till its privatisation 
and had no influence in credits market. Its dominant position from 1997- 2000 has 
been results of inherited excess of credits. 
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Analysing the concentration index for total credits, we conclude that till of end 
2007, 5 banks of G3 that we mentioned above have a dominant position like as in 
the other activities. During this period H-index has been almost the same, with 
some small changes. The credit indicators have not evidenced any change, reflect-
ing the greatest stability in years. Table 3 presents the empirical results on concen-
tration of credits market. 
Table 3. Concentration ratios (%) and HHI for credits 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
CR3 78 69 62 54 46 43 43 45 47 
CR5 91 86 83 79 69 63 64 66 68 
HHI 0.27 0.20 0.17 0.15 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 
Source: Bank of Albania, Supervision Annual Report, 2000-2008, own calculations 
The lending activity is less concentrated in Albanian banking market, also showing 
the incident on the concentration trend. Credit market is characterized by a moder-
ate level of concentration during the years 2002 - 2008, with HHI within border 
0.1-0.18, which corresponds to a moderate level of concentration. Although, the 
low values of concentration indicators of credit market, in 2008; put a slight in-
crease of these indicators compared to 2006 and 2007.  
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is correlated to the number of banks and the annual 
interest rate of credit. The econometric analysis presents the estimation of follow-
ing linear model: 
 cHHI = 0.438 – 0.023 * nr + 0.50 * cr 
Results are significant (because R2 = 0.96), but the coefficients of variables are sig-
nificant, too (p<0.05). In the meantime, the effect of the number of banks on HHI 
for credits is consistent to the theory. As we see in the model, the sign of number of 
banks is negative. That means a negative relationship between HHI for credits and 
the number of banks. If we refer to the effect of the annual interest rate for credits is 
positive. That means the increasing of annual interest rate of credits associated with 
rising of HHI for credits. Growing up of annual interest rate for credits linked to the 
prospect of banks’ behavior in the market. The impact of their behavior inclined to 
the market concentration, referring to SCP paradigm.    
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Source: Supervision Annual Report of Bank of Albania, 2000-2008, own calculations 
Figure 1. Development of HHI during 2000 - 2008 
 
Let us see the problem from another point of view. The figure 1 presents the graph 
of HHI for assets, deposits and credits compare to optimal value of HHI during 
2000 – 2008. As we see, we conclude the trend of HHI for assets and deposits is the 
same, while the trend of HHI for credits is different from assets and deposits. The 
tendency of these indices is towards optimal concentration level6 (that means the 
competition market), though the latter one is still far from being achieved. Reduced 
banking system concentration level is attributed to reorganization of this sector. 
Banks of G2 peer group are benefiting from loss of terrain of large banks of G3 
peer group. The Albanian banking market comparing to the optimal value of HHI 
(as we see in figure 1, it is approximately straight line) is considered to be highly 
concentrated in terms of assets and deposits, and moderately concentrated, close to 
perfect competition, in terms of lending. 
4.2.4 Market concentrations on Treasure bills 
Because of missing data for T-bills in the same period of other components, we are 
going to make the comparative analysis of H-index just for three years from two 
terms of period. In Albania Tirana Stock exchange doesn’t exist and is still one of 
the main challenges of the financial system. The attempts to develop this market 
have been focused on the formulation of laws and constructions of institutions that 
will participate in it. The result is: there are no shares listed in the stock market and 
an official stock market doesn’t exit. The only securities that are trading are T-bills. 
In absence of stock exchange T-bills are traded from Bank of Albania .Thus T-bills 
activity evaluates as indicator of competition. From the data according to the distri-
                                                     
6 Market share of each bank is equal to others, equal to 1/n  (n- number of banks). This reduces HHI=1/n 
because market share of each bank and the mean market share are equal. See subsection 4.1 
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bution of T-bills portfolio, results that SB had dominant position. HHI-index was 
high continuously, the nearest 1, and it means that SB had monopole position in 
this market. Market structure of T-bills in Albanian banking sector was monopoly. 
This dominant position at 2007 belongs to 5 banks. Also treasury bills market is 
accompanied by very high concentrations ratios, but the trend is incident. CR3 and 
CR5 values are respectively 90% and 96% in 2003, while in 2007; CR3 and CR5 are 
69% and 76%. Table 4 presents the empirical results.  
Table 4. Concentration ratios (%) for treasure bills 
Year 2003 2005 2007 
CR3 90 82 69 
CR5 96 86 76 
Note: Seri is smaller than the other components due to lack of data for treasure bills by BoA 
Source: Supervision Annual Report of Bank of Albania, 2003, 2005, 2007.  
If we refer to table 5, the value of HHI is 0.86, the nearest 1, in 1999. High values 
of concentration indicators speak for the more concentrated of treasury bills market, 
this comes as a result of the inherent structure of the banking sector where the Sav-
ings Bank (now Raiffeisen Bank) dominated the market of treasury bills (before its 
privatization). Recently noticed a diversification of treasury bills market between 
the banks of the sector, but still remains a market with high concentration. This 
situation demonstrates again the concentration in favor of G3 banks. HHI for treas-
ure bills is decreasing significantly until 2007, but it notes a slight increasing at 
2008 due to occurring of several mergers of foreign banks during 2007 and their 
impacts on concentration showed in 2008. 
Table 5. Value of HHI for treasure bills 
Year 1999 2000 2007 2008 
HHI 0.86 0.76 0.55 0.62 
These calculations of HHI for T-Bills are calculating by dividing banks into peer group: G1, G2, G3 but 
the composition of banking sector has a different formatting for period 1999-2000 and 2007-2008. HHI is 
calculated to consider each group and then apply Kwoka version (1985). Source: BoA. 
4.3 Concentration and ownership in Albanian banking sector  
Despite the pre-transition historical differences, during the past decade the banking 
systems in SEE-6 have been transformed by three major trends - privatization, con-
solidation and the entry of foreign banks on a large scale (Turner, 2006). The role 
of foreign-owned banks has become dominant in Central and Eastern Europe, in-
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cluding in the SEE-6 countries. Foreign banks penetrated these markets either di-
rectly by establishing Greenfield operations or by participating in privatization of 
domestic state owned banks. During this period, Albanian banking sector is charac-
terized by domination of foreign capital. In recent years it has emerged a new trend 
of ownership changes or control to banks’ shareholders through stocks’ transac-
tions. 
During 2008, the banking system’s capital incurred important structural changes, 
which brought about the increase of foreign capital domination in the system. With 
regard to Credins Bank, the sale of common shares, owned by a private Albanian 
shareholder, to two foreign investors raised the share of foreign capital in this bank 
to 33.34 percent, as compared to 5 percent in 2007. Regarding ProCredit Bank, two 
of its shareholders, FEFAD (domestic capital) and IFC (capital from the USA) sold 
all their shares, 25 percent and 11.25 percent respectively, to Procredit Holding, 
thus turning this bank into a bank entirely owned by foreign capital originating 
from the European Union. At Union Bank, during 2008 the European Bank for Re-
construction and Development purchased 12.5 percent of the shareholders’ capital. 
This development marks the entry of foreign capital to the last bank of the system 
that was entirely owned by domestic capital, thus decreasing the share of domestic 
capital in our banking system. 
At end-December 20087, foreign capital in the system was ALL 50.3 billion, or 
91.8 percent (versus 88.8 percent in 2007), while domestic capital was ALL 4.5 
billion, or 8.2 percent of the total capital. Domestic state-owned capital represents 
40 percent of shares owned by the Albanian Government in the United Bank of Al-
bania (see figure 11). Based on a peer-group analysis, the large banks of G3 group 
continue to be supported by permanent foreign resources. The capital structure of 
G2 medium-sized banks and G1 small-sized banks includes both foreign and Alba-
nian capital, where foreign capital has the highest share-88 percent and 76 percent 
of total capital, respectively. 
                                                     
7 Source: Annual Supervision Report, 2008. 
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Figure 2. Paid-in Capital of the System by country of origin in 2008 
 
Domination of foreign capital and its increasing tendency is also characteristic of 
other banking systems in the region. Comparing and contrasting our banking sys-
tem with those of the region (table 6), we notice that foreign capital in our banking 
system has a higher share to total capital, than in any other country of the region, 
except for Croatia. 
Table 6. Share of foreign capital in some regional countries 
No. of banks Foreign capital share (in %)  
Country 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 
Albania 16 17 17 86.3 85.7 88.8 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 24 23 22 70.2 75.5 74.2 
Bulgaria 34 32 29 74.9 72.8 72.8 
Croatia 38 38 38 81.7 86.6 90.8 
Slovenia 25 25 27 34.9 37.7 37.7 
Serbia 40 37 35 53.8 73.1 77.2 
Moldova 16 15 16 50.6 62.7 71.9 
Romania 40 39 42 68.9 78.8 79.4 
Source: BSCEE REVIEW 2007 
5 Conclusions 
After 1997 crisis, the macroeconomic environment led to important changes in Al-
banian banking sector which was involved in liquidation, restructuring, privatiza-
tion and acquisition activities of some banks. The estimation results provide consis-
tent evidence that as concentration in banking increases, the bank lending channel 
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weakens, causing monetary policy to be less effective. Transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy demonstrates low efficiency. The monetary policy outcomes fade 
in the lights of two factors such as: 
SB monopoly in Leks deposits market 
Limited activity of interbank market.  
The dominant position of Saving Bank, with over 60% of the total of deposits and 
the total of assets brought up distortion of banking market. The dominance of the 
Saving Bank in banking market resulted as the highest interest rates in the credits 
market too. In compliance with credits market, SB was impeded to extend credits 
till its privatisation and so had no influence in credits market, while loans from G2 
and G3 represented only 6.1 % of total of assets of banking system. So loans repre-
sented minimal figure, hence banks had chosen easy ways to make profits while 
minimizing risk. This situation brought up high interest rates. These highest costs 
of loans meant the highest costs of good and services, which were becoming one of 
the most important barriers to the competitiveness of Albanian goods. After the 
privatisation of Saving Bank, the credits market will be developed faster. Decreas-
ing trend of concentration in banking sector is attributed to reorganization of the 
sector. Banks of G2 group are benefiting from losing ground to major banks of G3 
group. The market concentrations have linked to banks consolidation. The paper 
finds a strong evidence of change to the market structure in Albanian banking sec-
tor. Albanian banking sector has been recently characterized by important structural 
developments. The most important of them are: 
• The enlarged number of banks  
• Restructuring and privatization of state-owned banks  
• Establishment of domestic capital banks 
• Entrance of powerful foreign banks through acquisitions of the existing ones 
which have changed the Albanian banking sector into a dynamic environment. 
There are more and more efforts made by banks to be better positioned in the mar-
ket. 
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